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The present size of the hidden economy in Norway is between 4 and 6 percent of GDP, of which 
hidden labor income constitutes about half. A survey approach reveals that 415 of the population is 
of the opinion that people in general accept income from moonlighting that is not reported, and 213 
believes that this share of acceptance is on the increase. Furthermore, surveys clearly show that 
hidden labor services are of satisfactory quality, that they mainly are paid for in cash, but with 
checks being increasingly used, and that buyers find it easier to obtain services from the hidden labor 
market than from the regular one. A shortening of the work week in order to alleviate unemployment 
may result in an increased supply of hidden labor. 
In addition to reporting two tries at estimating the size and growth of the 
hidden economy in Norway (section 2 and 3), the purpose of this paper is: 
To summarize the main findings of two surveys (in 1980 and 1983) on the 
hidden labor market in Norway (section 4). 
To tentatively discuss certain aspects of the hidden labor market such as 
quality of the working force, paucity of information and pricing rules 
(section 5). 
To analyze a special case, i.e. labor market behaviour of married couples 
where the husband works in the "white" sector but with the opportunity 
of underreporting his income. The wife on the other hand only has work 
opportunities in the "black" labor market (section 6). 
The main conclusions are summarized as follows: 
It is extremely difficult to arrive at any precise and reliable estimate of 
the size of the hidden economy in Norway (in any country, we would 
venture). Our educated guess is that the hidden economy in Norway now 
constitutes 4-6 percent of GDP, of which about half is hidden labor income. 
The Cagan-Gutmann method for estimating the growth of the hidden 
economy in Norway in the 1970s gives unreasonable results. It is very 
hard to believe that the hidden economy decreased from 1.4 percent of 
GDP in 1972 to 0.6 percent in 1973, and then in leaps jumped to 6.3 
percent in 1978. 
The survey studies suggest that as much as 35 percent of the adult popula- 
tion in a 12-month period at least once bought and/or sold hidden labor 
services. 
About 80 percent of services rendered in the hidden labor market are paid 
in cash. People availing themselves of services in the hidden labor market 
are satisfied with the quality of work and in general they find black services 
more easily available than white ones. 
About 415 of the population believe that people in general find the hidden 
labor market acceptable, and 213 expects it to become increasingly so. 
Also, about 213 of the population foresees a growing hidden labor market. 
Imperfect information in the hidden labor market paves the way for 
mechanical pricing rules rather than a Walrasian auctioneer. In Norway 
in some trades a practice may have developed whereby the buyer, in 
making use of the black rather than the white labor market, saves the 
value added tax (20 percent) and the seller his marginal income tax (which 
on average was close to 50 percent in 1982). 
Based on the fitting of a tax function to the existing tax rules in Norway, 
and on an additive utility function, it is shown that for couples reduction 
in the regular working hours for one makes the other work more in the 
hidden economy. 
This section draws heavily on the thorough work of Klovland (1980). With 
minor modifications his model and results for 1978 are reproduced. Next we 
employ his measure of excess cash to calculate annual growth rates of the hidden 
economy. Finally, some critical comments as to the reliability of this approach 
are given. 
2.1. The Hidden Economy in 1978 
This method of estimating the size of the hidden economy is based on the 
demand for currency. It is contended that higher tax rates promote tax evasion, 
which, in turn, increases the demand for currency (Cagan 1958, Gutmann 1977, 
Tanzi 1982). To model behavior the following variables are needed: 
C = currency held by the public 
P = price index 
Y = real GDP 
i =rate of return on time deposits 
.rr = rate of inflation 
CON/ Y = private consumption as a share of GDP 
t =total taxes as a share of GDP 
0 = stock adjustment parameter 0 5 0 < 1 
Klovland specified his model as follows: 
where C" is the long run demand for currency. 
C* CON In-=a,+a, In Y + a , i + a 3 ~ + a 4 -  Y + a,t. P 
The signs below the equation give the expected signs of the coefficients. 
These coefficients were estimated by a single-equation approach. A fourth- 
degree Almon lag of the tax variable was employed since the effects of higher 
tax rates on tax evasion are likely to be spread out in time. The coefficient 
attached to the tax variable, a,, is the sum of lagged coefficients. Annual data 
were used, covering the period 1952-78. 
The estimation gave the following result (t-values in the parentheses): 
C CON 
(3) In - = - 1.250 + 0.309 In Y - O.024i + 0.003 T + 0.001 -
(3.65) (3.41) (2.54) (0.03) (1.44) Y 
All the estimated coefficients, except for the coefficient attached to the 
inflation rate, have the expected signs. 
To proceed with the estimation of the size of the hidden economy we rewrite 
(3) as 
where the term Z& includes the a's and variables except for the tax rate. and 
6 ,  are estimated values. 
Predicted currency holdings at time T is then 
In order to obtain an estimate of the size of the hidden economy we selected 
1952 as a base year. Thus, if the tax rate had remained at the 1952 level, the 
predicted value of currency holdings would have been 
The difference, ACT = eT -e52,T would then give the increase in the amount of 
currency needed to fuel the tax evasion part of the economy compared to the 
currency needs if tax rates had remained at the 1952 levels. We next assume that 
no tax evasion took place in 1952 or in years before that. ACT would then yield 
an estimate of all currency circulating in the hidden economy at time T. Inserting 
observations for the assumed exogeneous variables we obtain the following 
estimate for T = 1978. 
(7) AC,,,, = 2.9 billion N kr. 
To complete the story we need an estimate of the income velocity of currency. 
Due to the Norwegian bank-giro system transaction balances have been enlarged 
to include a fraction of time deposits. Thus, the transaction balances employed, 
M1, include total currency, ordinary cheque accounts, wage accounts, postal 
giro deposits and 10 percent (a qualified guess) of total time deposits. In accord- 
ance with Tanzi (1980) and others we assume that the income velocity of currency 
in the hidden economy equals the velocity of M1 money in the official parts of 
the economy. Hence, for 1978 we obtained 
where V,,,, is the velocity rate, Y,, is the official GDP in 1978, MI7, is M1 
money in 1978 (with parts of time deposits included as explained above) and 
LC7, is estimated in (7). 
Let Y& denote the GDP contribution from the black economy in 1978, to 
obtain, 
(9) Y E  = Vl,78. AC78 = 5.0.2.9 = 14.5 billion N kr. 
and 
So that the black economy was 6.3 percent of registered GDP in Norway in 1978.' 
Rewriting (8) and (9) in more general form gives 
(12) 
By inserting (11) into (12) and 
the observed one, we have 
taking the unobserved economy as a fraction of 
Based on dynamic post-sample simulations Klovland (1980, p. 32) has calculated 
the difference between the actual and predicted stock of cash, where predictions 
are based on the tax rules as of 1952. Using this difference as a proxy for AC, 
the relative size of the hidden economy for the years 1971-78 was calculated. 
The results are given in Table 1. 
We consider it highly unlikely that the unobserved economy as a percentage 
of the observed one, roughly speaking, was halved from 1972 to 1973 only to 
treble from 1974 to 1975, and then double again in the period 1975-78. The 
contention that the cash approach to measuring the hidden economy gives 
unreasonable results is substantiated by Klovland's re-estimation of the demand 
' Klovland (1980) employed a narrow definition of the money stock and arrived at a higher 
velocity, i.e. 6.7. As a percentage of observed GDP, the black economy then becomes 9.2. 
TABLE I 
THE UNOBSERVED ECONOMY AS 
PERCENTAGE OF THE OBSERVED 
ECONOMY, 1971-78 
yB 
Year y:='. 100% 
y, 
for cash in Norway; proper modifications of equation (2) yield improved empirical 
results, however, at the cost of an insignificant tax variable (Klovland 1983). 
With the exit of the tax variable from (2) the hidden economy also disappears. 
To anticipate one result of our two surveys (conducted in 1980 and 1983), as 
much as 82 percent of hidden labor services were paid in cash. This finding 
certainly yields plausibility to the assumption that tax-evading activities are settled 
in cash. However, the hidden economy encompasses more than labor services 
and the means of payment here we have no measure of. With checking accounts 
becoming more common, especially as workers are paid by transfer to their 
"wage-account" with the bank rather than in cash, it is not unlikely that checks 
uuen economy. increasingly are used as a means of payment in the hiA" 
For the payee payment by check does not leave any trace if the check is 
cashed or if it is made payable to the payor, and signed by him on the back. In 
the context of the hidden economy this implies that checks become a very close 
substitute to cash. 
The use of bank-giro, on the other hand, requires that the receiving as well 
as the paying bank keep a copy of the order to transfer. Such copies are easily 
controlled by the IRS. As the public becomes more aware of the indeed very 
limited possibilities of controlling payments by checks (as opposed to giro) one 
would expect checks to become an increasingly used means of payment in the 
hidden economy. 
A more serious problem with the cash approach is the underlying assumption 
of a stable demand for currency in the observed economy. In the U.S. in the 
mid-1970s the predictions of the money stock (M 1) based on conventional money 
demand equations resulted in consistent and considerable overpredictions. This 
episode of "missing money" is analyzed by Judd & Scadding (1982) who conclude 
that the most likely cause of the observed instability in the demand for money 
after 1973 is innovation in financial arrangements (p. 101 4). Financial innovations, 
25 
partly prompted by regulations and high inflation rates, have been introduced in 
Norway as well. More widespread use of credit cards, increased liquidity of 
various interest-bearing bank deposits etc. make for closer substitutes for currency. 
Thus, the stability of an estimated demand for currency equation is likely to be 
impaired, and calculations of "tax-induced" cash holdings to be more cumber- 
some and less reliable (cf. Klovland's new finding, reported above, that the tax 
parameter no longer is significant in the demand for currency equation). 
The assumption that the income velocity of money is equal in the observed 
and unobserved economy is a crucial assumption in need of empirical verification. 
Suffice it here to make two observations. First, as Cagan (1958) observed, "black 
cash" to a greater extent may be used as a store of value, implying that its velocity 
is lower that its "white" counterpart. In this case the cash method exaggerates 
the size of the hidden economy. Second, Feige (1979) contends that unobserved 
economic activity is service-intensive, implying that value added per dollar 
transacted is higher in the unobserved sector than in the observed parts of the 
economy. For a given amount of "black" transactions the GDP content is higher 
than for a similar amount of "white" transactions. On this score the cash method 
thus tends to underestimate the size of the hidden economy. 
A final remark on the cash approach is related to the international role of 
a country's currency. In the post World War I1 period the dollar has come to be 
extensively used both as a store of value and as a means of payment in other 
countries. In open economies plagued by two- and three-digit inflation rates, e.g. 
countries in Latin-America, Iceland, Israel etc., dollar bills have been available 
and most likely increasingly been used for domestic transactions. Excess issue 
of U.S. currency, not accounted for by observable domestic factors, may thus be 
floating around in other countries rather than supporting hidden economic 
activities within the U.S. Hence, the high estimates of the hidden economy for 
the U.S. as reported by Feige and Gutman could be biased upward. Less biased 
estimates (cf. Tanzi 1982) available for the U.S. economy are more in line with 
the estimates given in the present paper for the Norwegian economy. 
In summary, Gutmann's 4-page paper in Financial Analysts Journal in 1977 
is remarkable in the sense of generating extensive research in the area of un- 
observed economic activities. However, thorough application of the cash method to 
estimate the size and growth of the hidden economy in Norway gives untenable 
results. Hidden economic activities, which we consider likely both to be important 
and on the increase, thus require other approaches. Thus, we now turn to estimations 
based on survey studies. 
In  September 1980 and again in April 1983 a private polling institute under- 
took a survey on hidden economic activities in Norway. In both surveys about 
one thousand people were asked to fill in a questionnaire and mail it back to the 
institute. And in both surveys about 70 percent complied with this request. 
The method and main findings of the 1980 survey are reasonably well 
documented in Isachsen, Klovland & Strprm (1982). The analysis of the 1983 
survey has barely begun. Suffice it to say that the findings suggest a modest but 
not significant decline in hidden labor market a~t ivi t ies .~ Stratifying the sample 
according to sex and age, the picture revealed in Table 2 emerges. 
TABLE 2 
1980 1983 
1. Worked unregistered last 12 months 18 16 
2. Paid for unregistered work last 12 months 26 25 
3. Worked and paid 6 8 
4. (1 + 2 - 3) Participated in the hidden labor market 38 33 
Taking the average one arrives at a figure of 35 percent, with the 95 percent 
confidence interval being bracketed by 32-38 percent. 
In Isachsen, Klovland & Strom (1982, p. 215) we offer various estimates of 
the size of the hidden labor market, arriving at 2.3 percent of GDP as the most 
reasonable one. Applying the same approach to the 1983 survey yields a figure 
of about 2 percent. 
In the 1983 survey a new question appeared, namely total income unreported 
in the income declaration last year. Comparing total undeclared income to hidden 
labor income, the latter constitutes 65 percent of the former. Putting some 
confidence in the 2 percent figure as a measure of the size of the hidden labor 
market in 1983, one arrives at an estimate of the size of the hidden economy of 
about 3 percent of GDP. 
However, our feeling is that a correction item is called for to counter the 
unavoidable downward bias in the answers, especially so for income not declared 
last year. Thus, as an educated guess we suggest the present size of the hidden 
economy being between 4 and 6 percent of GDP, of which hidden labor income 
constitutes about half. The size has remained unchanged over the last few years. 
Neither space nor time allow us to give the detailed picture of the hidden labor 
market in Norway as it emerges from the surveys. In this section we confine 
ourselves to reporting some findings on: 
detection 
attitudes and growth 
experience of buyers. 
Currently, participation rates in the hidden labor market according to socio- 
economic variables such as sex, age, education and geographical location are 
The publication of our 1980 findings generated considerable stir about tax cheating in Norway. 
It may be the case that the increased concern by the media as well as by the politicians (does the 
media dictate what politicians should be concerned about?) have made people somewhat more 
reluctant to admit cheating in our 1983 survey. The fact that the response rate decreased by 3-4 
percentage points may indicate such a trend. 
being analyzed. It is very likely that the 1983 survey will reproduce the 1980 
findings (see Isachsen, Klovland & Str@m 1982), which can be summarized as 
follows: 
Men are more active in the hidden labor market than women. 
The participation rate in the hidden labor market decreases with age 
(youngest age group recorded, 18-24 years old). 
Based on years of education the participation rate in the hidden labor 
market first increases and then decreases, i.e. people with 8-12 years of 
schooling, e.g. vocational training, are most heavily involved. 
Looked at from the buyer's side, the demand for hidden labor services 
increases with education. 
The rendering of hidden labor services is equally common in the cities 
and in the countryside. 
4.1. Detection 
The results of two questions on detection are reported in percentages in 
Tables 3 and 4. 
TABLE 3 
WHICH OF THE REASONS LISTED BELOW DO YOU T H I N K  PEOPLE IN GENERAL BELIEVE 
MOST EASILY WILL LEAD TO DETECTION OF UNREPORTED INCOME 
High level of consumption compared to income 
The authorities' effort in general in discovering tax evasion 
Reported to tax authorities by neighbors/acquaintances 
Acquaintances working with the IRS 
Previously been detected for tax evasion 
Spot checks 
Don't know 
TABLE 4 
H o w  DO YOU THINK PEOPLE I N  GENERAL EVALUATE 
THE LIKELIHOOD OF DETECTION IF NOT REPORTING 
INCOME FROM MOONLIGHTING? 
1980 1983 
Most likely to be detected 5 
Likely to be detected 4 
Perhaps detected 30 
Likely not to be detected 43 
Most likely not to be detected 14 
Unanswered 4 
Information on how the authorities go about detecting tax evasion is cot 
available. However, it seems reasonable that conspicuous consumption and the 
authorities' efforts in general as well as spot checks are most important in revealing 
tax evasion. 
Concerning the likelihood of detection the first two optiins, i.e. most likely 
to be and likely to be detected, are down from 9 percent in 1980 to 5 percent in 
1983. However, adding the perhaps option the figure comes to an astonishing 36 
percent in 1983. With the authorities' very modest success in revealing tax evasion, 
our educated guess on the likelihood of detection more properly is most likely 
not detected. If our guess is correct the majority exaggerates the risk of being 
caught. 
However, the likelihood of detection: 
decreases with education and income (better insight?) 
is lower for craftsmen (experience?) 
is lower for men than for women (insight and experience?) 
The surveys further revealed that people with low income tend to exaggerate 
their marginal tax rate. The basis for this conclusion is a comparison between 
the reported marginal tax rates and the marginal tax we can calculate on the 
basis of the answers on net and gross income. Perceived tax rates are higher than 
the true ones, but misperception decreases with income. This might reflect stronger 
incentives for well-paid people to know the true tax rates, but also the fact that 
there is an upper bound on the marginal tax rate (around 75 percent). Further, 
as income and education are positively correlated, higher education may make 
people increasingly aware of the true tax rates. Provided that higher marginal 
taxes induce people to more unreported economic activities and that higher 
likelihood of detection works in the opposite direction, it may be the case that 
some people offer their optimal hours of work in the hidden labor market in 
spite of incorrect perception of the underlying parameters. 
4.2. Attitudes and Growth 
In an attempt to reveal the general attitudes towards hidden labor income 
the following two questions were posed: 
Do you thing people in general accept that income from moonlighting is 
not reported, or do you think people in general don't accept nonreporting 
of such incomes? 
Do you think people in general increasingly will accept nonreporting of 
income from moonlighting or decreasingly so? 
A third question was related to one's own perception: 
Do you think that unreported income from moonlighting will increase or 
decrease? 
The answers in percentages to these three questions are summarized 
in Table 5. 
Roughly speaking, the table indicates that moonlighting increasingly is 
believed to be accepted (up from 76 percent in 1980 to 80 percent in 1983). This 
trend is expected to continue and unreported income from moonlighting is 
expected to increase. 
TABLE 5 
(1) Moonlighting and non-reporting in general is accepted 
Not accepted 
Don't know 
Unanswered 
(2) Moonlighting and non-reporting in general will become more 
acceptable 
Less acceptable 
Don't know 
Inanswered 
(3) Moonlighting and non-reporting will increase 
Decrease 
Don't know 
Unanswered 
In commenting on these results a leading Social Democrat expressed concern 
that people's attitude towards tax evasion reminded him about people's attitude 
towards home-made liquor, both types of activities being illegal, but nevertheless 
growing and increasingly considered acceptable by the common man. 
To get a firmer grasp on people's attitudes towards tax policy in the welfare 
state four statements were presented and the respondent was asked whether he 
agreed or not. Table 6 summarizes the findings, in percentage distribution. 
Comparing the first two columns of Table 6 the "moral standard" seems 
elevated; although a solid majority still finds the tax burden an impediment to 
working overtime, the percentage is down from 80 in 1980 to 68 in 1983. Further, 
there is a growing understanding of the welfare state requiring the present levels 
of taxes (up from 31 percent to 39 percent). On understanding people's desire 
for unreported income the percentage is down although 213 still agrees with the 
statement. Finally, about 1/3 feels that tax evaders should be severely punished, 
up from 114. 
Summing up, it seems somewhat difficult to reconcile the answers reported 
in Tables 5 and 6. It should be kept in mind, however, that the first two questions 
in Table 5 reveal one's perception of (other) people's attitudes in general, i.e. an 
excursus in positive economics, whereas the statements in Table 6 try to capture 
one's own attitudes and are more normative in nature. An attempt at reconciling 
the two tables may thus run as follows: 
In thetearly 1980s people in Norway became increasingly inclined to think 
that moonhghting is accepted by the common man although the individual himself 
became somewhat more sceptical about the tendency of increased tax evasion. 
TABLE 6 
ATTITUDES TOWARDS TAX POLICY IN THE WELFARE STATE 
Do you agree or 
disagree with the Neither agree Don't know/ 
following statements? Agree nor disagree Disagree unanswered 
1980 1983 1980 1983 1980 1983 1980 1983 
(1) Tax burden so 
heavy that people 
are not interested 
in working 
overtime 80 68 
(2) The welfare state 
necessitates present 
level of taxes 31 39 
(3) Understandable 
that people like to 
get work where 
income goes 
unreported 73 66 
(4) Tax evasion should 
be punished 
severely 25 32 
4.3. Experiences of Buyers 
In both surveys about 25 percent of the respondents acknowledged in the 
previous twelve month period at least once having paid for services rendered 
where the income was unlikely to be reported. A closer study of buyer's 
experiences is rewarding. 
First, in both surveys 82 percent of buyers reported that hidden labor services 
were paid in cash. The use of checks increased from 5 percent in 1980 to 11 per 
cent in 1983. 
Second, on the quality of work an overwhelming majority of the buyers 
expressed satisfaction; more than 19 out of 20 in each survey. This finding sharply 
contradicts the allegation put forward by the Federation of Craftsmen to the 
effect that hidden labor services are of inferior quality. The rational for such an 
allegation is perhaps found in the Federation's desire to limit competition in 
their own trades. By trying to convince people that payment without receipt is 
tantamount to inferior work, they try to fend off new competitors, i.e. "le 
travailleur noir." 
However, this is a two-edged sword. Many a member of the Federation of 
Craftsmen obviously offers his own services or those of his firm in the hidden 
labor market. Minor repair jobs the firm may distribute among their craftsmen 
to be undertaken as hidden labor, sometimes during the regular hours of work. 
Also it is becoming commonplace when buying e.g. a washing machine that 
the store can supply you with a plumber after 5 p.m. to install the machine, on 
the understanding that payment is made without receipt. 
In certain crafts such as auto repair some shops offer a 4 day work week, 
with the opportunity of utilizing the facilities also the fifth day. The popularity 
of such a scheme most likely is related to the opportunity it offers for tax evasion 
on the part of the mechanics. 
Third, in terms of availability of labor services, almost 60 percent of the 
buyers in both surveys contended that black services were more easily available 
than white ones, whereas 36 per cent in both surveys indicated no difference. 
This leaves us with less than 5 percent considering it more difficult to get black 
rather than white services undertaken (2 and 3 percent respectively left this 
question unanswered). 
Summing up, the surveys clearly show that hidden labor services are of 
satisfactory quality, that they mainly are paid for in cash, although checks are 
increasingly used, and that the buyers find it easier to obtain services from the 
hidden labor market than from the regular one. 
From a journalistic point of view the most fascinating aspects of the hidden 
economy seem to be its size and growth and the amount of tax evasion it implies. 
Such information also is of interest to the economist. However, in order to get 
a better understanding of the impact of the hidden economy on the total one, 
we should like to have more detailed knowledge. In this section we offer some 
comments on how positive shifts in demand and supply schedules in the hidden 
labor market affect its size, on possible effects of imperfect information, and on 
the productivity of tax-evading workers. 
For macroeconomic planning purposes it is useful to know how changes in 
various parameters affect the supply of labor. Provided that the hidden labor 
market already is of some size and perhaps also on the increase, there is a need 
for studying labor market behavior within a model allowing for a dual labor 
market, i.e. an observed as well as an unobserved sector. The final section of this 
paper takes up the special case of a couple's supply of labor in such a setting. 
5.1. Impact on Size of Shifts in Demand and Supply 
Over the last decade or so a variety of factors seem to indicate that in the 
hidden labor market outward shifts in both supply and demand schedules have 
taken place. Among factors pushing the supply curve outwards the following are 
often m e n t i ~ n e d : ~  
Increased tax burden. 
A growing labor force, and an especially rapid growth in lower age groups. 
(Our surveys indicate that supply of hidden labor decreases with age.) 
Substantial increase in the pool of the unemployed. 
Reduced regular work week. 
Technical progress which makes chores less time-consuming (e.g. washing 
machines, prepared food etc.). 
Changing attitudes, i.e. unreported income more acceptable (cf. survey). 
Alienation. Henry (1978) maintains that the hidden labor market is more 
conducive to social relations than the impersonal regular one. 
Isachsen & Strdm (1981) have a more detailed discussion. 
Reduced probability of detection. 
On the demand side increased real income conventionally leads to a change 
in the composition of demand, away from goods towards services. Services being 
highly labor intensive and in many cases suitable for unrecorded trading, 
economic growth per se may shift the demand schedule for hidden labor services 
outwards. 
The point we now like to make is an elementary one, which nevertheless 
seems to have escaped quite a few commentators on the hidden economy, namely 
that simultaneous outward shifts in demand and supply schedules obviously 
result in increased quantity being traded although not necessarily in increased 
value. If the supply shift dominates (relative) prices may fall. It is conceivable 
although not likely that the relative decline in prices will outweigh the relative 
increase in quantity to make the product, i.e. the value of hidden transactions 
(in real prices), fall. In such a case Hidden economic activities have increased 
whereas hidden GDP as percentage of the measured one has declined. 
5.2. Imperfect Information and Pricing Rules 
It is in the nature of hidden economic activities that they cannot freely be 
advertised. Information on demand and supply thus differs among individuals, 
and prices charged and obtained for similar services vary. "The law of one price" 
does not hold.4 A well known consequence of trading at different prices is loss 
of efficiency. 
Figure 1. The Hidden Labor Market 
Assume now that not everyone is familiar with the hidden labor market but 
those who are have full information. The situation is depicted by a dashed 
demand and supply schedule in Figure 1. The solid lines indicate supply and 
Whether it holds in the observed sector is a matter of controversy. However, it seems safe to  
assume that price discrimination is more widespread in the hidden economy. 
3 3 
demand schedules in the case of everybody having full information on the hidden 
labor market (which, in this case is not hidden anymore but only a vehicle for 
the risky business of tax evasion). In the dashed lines case trading takes place 
at uniform prices, at (N',, W',). However, lack of information still generates an 
efficiency loss, in terms of the difference between NB and N',. 
Now, let more potential buyers become aware of the hidden labor market, 
whereas the information among suppliers remains unchanged. Wages and hours 
worked will go up, the equilibrium point will move towards point A in Figure 
1. Conversely, if more sellers, i.e. workers, are informed, ceteris paribus, the 
equilibrium point will move towards B. 
This diagram illustrates two simple points: 
Suppliers of hidden labor services want their services to be known by 
potential customers but not by their colleagues. Likewise, buyers will 
benefit from increased supply at unchanged demand. 
A movement from C towards D is compatible with various paths, depend- 
ing upon the order in which buyers and sellers enter the market. 
Invoking the more reasonable assumption that most people have limited 
information on the hidden labor market the question we now raise is how prices 
are determined. 
In the extreme case there is just one buyer and one seller, i.e. a bilateral 
monopoly. From the theory of monopoly we know that the trading point is on 
the contract curve, but its exact location is indeterminate. The monopoly profit 
to be exploited consists of taxes evaded, e.g. the value added tax plus marginal 
income tax of the worker. 
In Norway the average marginal income tax is an astonishing 50 percent 
whereas the value added tax is 20 percent. By present laws the seller should 
report all income on his annual income declaration whereas the buyer has no 
duty to ask for a receipt or report the transaction. Thus, in case of detection the 
seller of hidden labor services is much more likely to suffer than the buyer. It is 
therefore reasonable that he be compensated for greater risk. One commonly 
used pricing rule is therefore the following. The seller asks whether VAT should 
be included or not, thus offering the buyer the opportunity of tax evasion. If 
accepted, the buyer saves the value added tax (20 percent). The seller, on his 
part, saves his marginal income tax (on average 50 percent). 
Without further probing, it seems reasonable that generally accepted and 
"fair" pricing rules are established in the hidden labor market, due to information 
failure and a skewed distribution of risk. 
5.3. Productivity 
In discussing the productivity of black labor it is useful to distinguish between 
people who voluntarily switch their supply of labor from the observed sector to 
the unobserved one, and those who are laid off. Thurow (1980) has observed 
that although workers within a firm basically are paid the same, the most efficient 
workers can have a productivity three times their least efficient colleagues. In the 
unobserved sector the firm usually is quite small-quite often only the individual 
himself-and payment more likely is according to productivity. Thus, the highly 
productive worker has an incentive to redirect his labor supply towards the 
unobserved sector whereas the less productive one has not. 
Concerning the second group, those who are laid off, one would think that 
they in general are low-productivity workers. However, in modern economies 
job safety usually increases with duration of employment. Thurow (1980) main- 
tains that job security for established workers is an important prerequisite for 
their willingness to teach newcomers. Otherwise the older workers would feel 
threatened by increased productivity of the younger ones, and obstruct the 
learning process. To avoid such obstruction the firm has to pay a price, i.e. job 
security increases with seniority. Thus, one would also expect to find many 
high-productivity workers among laid-off people, although greater variance in 
productivity than among those who voluntarily switch from the observed to the 
unobserved labor markets is likely. 
However, people whose regular work is difficult to sell in the hidden economy, 
e.g. a lecture in microeconomics, may have to develop new skills in order to enter 
the hidden economy. In this period of building up marketable human capital, 
their productivity and earnings are likely to be modest. 
Rather than redirecting one's total hours of work to the unobserved sector, 
it is more common to work part-time in both sectors. The probability of detection 
is reduced when part of the income is visible. Further, the buyer of hidden services 
may feel more assured of the quality of the services rendered knowing that the 
seller masters his trade in the observed labor market. 
Among econometricians recently there has been growing interest in the 
behavior of couples, especially how tax-rates, demographic factors and regulation 
of the work-day (in ordinary markets) affect female labor supply. Compared to 
other countries the participation of women in the labor force in Norway is rather 
low. However, the 1970s experienced a dramatic increase in women's participation 
in paid labor activities. 
In the present model we allow the wife only to work in the hidden economy. 
The objective function is to maximize the expected utility for a couple. It is 
assumkd that an increase in leisure time for one, ceteris paribus, increases the 
demand for leisure of the other. The husband has fixed hours of work (L), a 
given wage rate ( W M )  and non-labor income from wealth ( Y,,.,,). Thus, his total 
pre-tax income amounts to 
However, he has an opportunity of tax evasion through improper filling in of 
the annual income declaration. The share not reported is denoted h, so that 
income not taxed becomes 
As far as the wife is concerned she has no capital income and she only works in 
the hidden sector, where no taxes are paid. She can freely decide on hours of work. 
We thus have 
where 
YF: Wife's income 
X,: Wife's income not reported 
WE: Wage rate in black sector 
LB: Hours worked in black sector. 
There is, of course, a variety of other cases that should be considered. This 
is being done elsewhere. In this section we only report on a special case that 
perhaps captures real-life behavior for many couples. 
With P as the subjective probability of detection, U indicating the utility 
function, T the tax function and f the expected penalty rate if detected, the 
maximization problem can now be stated as follows: 
where 
C,, is income (or consumption) if not detected, Cd if detected. In Equation (5) 
it is assumed that detection of one results in total tax fraud of the couple being 
revealed, and subjected to the penalty rate J: 
Now, in order unambigously to sign partial derivatives the tax function and 
the utility function are specified. An additive utility function is assumed, with 
diminishing absolute risk aversion and constant relative risk aversion. Drawing 
upon estimations based on Frisch's (1959) complete scheme and on Norwegian 
data around 1980 (cross-section and time series) this relative risk aversion comes 
out to be 1.47. 
The tax schedule is based on the fitting of a function on the existing tax 
rules and legal deduction behavior in Norway in 1980. For complete specification 
five parameters are required, 
increase in a = increased progressivity at every interval. 
increase in e = shortening of tax brackets (i.e. progressivity goes up). 
increase in do, d, = increase in legal deductions of income to arrive at taxable 
income. 
increase in b =tax rate on gross income increases. 
and the tax function is 
With this apparatus at hand we want to analyze how changes in various 
parameters affect the extent of underreporting by the husband (XM = YM. h) and 
hours of hidden labor activity of the wife (L,). The question thus becomes to 
sign the partial derivatives of the arguments in equations (6) and (7). 
Case 1. The income of the husband ( Y,) increases. There are three avenues 
for such an increase; 
the given work week is extended 
higher wage rate 
increased capital income. 
Results 
Increased YM implies that XM also increases. With higher income the couple 
better can afford taking the risk of underreporting. 
This effect applies also to the wife, to make her offer more hours of work 
in the hidden economy. However, there is an effect working in the opposite 
direction. Leisure being a normal good (due to an additive utility function) she 
now demands more of it. Being free to decide on hours of work (as opposed to 
the husband) she reduces her labor supply. In the specified model this effect 
dominates, making her hidden labor supply decline. 
Now, let us consider the case of a decrease in YM through a decline in the 
regular work week (L,), without any wage compensation, which presently is 
considered by some politicians as a means of reducing the unemployment rate. 
In terms of hidden economic activities this model indicates that the husband's 
underreporting is reduced, i.e. he becomes more honest, whereas the wife works 
longer hours, i.e. she becomes less honest! 
Case 2 .  For all income brackets the marginal tax rate increases, i.e. an 
increase in a. Note that an increase in a makes for a decline in the expected 
income of the husband as well as for the wife. 
Results 
The couple experiences a reduction in expected income. They can less afford 
to cheat. 
As far as the husband is concerned there is a stronger effect working in the 
other direction; higher marginal taxes make it more profitable to underreport. 
So he becomes less honest. 
In the wife's case the reduction in expected income implies that she less can 
afford leisure. However, her expected marginal income from work declines. In 
total effect 1 (less afford to cheat) and effect 3 (expected marginal income from 
work declines) outweigh effect 2 (less afford leisure) so that her supply of hidden 
labor declines. 
Case 3. Increase in subjective probability of detection (P) or in expected 
penalty tax rate (f). 
Results 
The effects here are straightforward; husband as well as wife reduce their 
hidden economic activities. In our 1980 survey the effect on willingness to evade 
taxes for both sexes significantly increased with a reduction in the probability of 
detection. The effect on willingness to cheat of changes in the penalty rate was 
much less clear. (Isachsen and Str$m 1981, p. 96). 
Case 4 .  Increased wage rate in the hidden labor market ( W,). 
Results 
The expected income of the couple increases and the husband increases 
underreporting. 
Leisure becomes more expensive for the wife (substitution effect) but she 
can afford more of it (income effect). The former dominates and she expands 
her supply of labor. 
Higher wage rate in the black market for the female thus induces both to 
become more dishonest. 
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